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Introduction:  Emerging Global 
Trends   
 
In November 2008, the National 
Intelligence Council published Global 
Trends 2025:  A Transformed World, 
an unclassified assessment of long-term 
trends shaping the future geopolitical 
landscape.1  This study identified a 
number of emerging trends that will 
affect significantly the character and 
direction of the future security 
environment over the next 15 to 20 
years, including:   
 
• The current international system is 
being transformed into a global 
multipolar one where the gaps in 
national power between developed 
and developing countries will 
continue to narrow.   
 
• The relative power of non-state 
actors—businesses, tribes, religious 
organizations, and even criminal 
networks—will also increase. 
 
• The United States will remain the 
single most powerful country but 
will be less dominant in the future 
international system. 
 
• A shift in relative wealth and 
economic power roughly from West 
to East is underway, and the current 
economic crisis is accelerating a 
global economic rebalancing, 
creating considerable risk of 
instability for developing countries 
with large account deficits. 
 
 
                                                
1 The report is available at 
www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html.   
• Future global economic and 
population growth will put pressure 
on energy, food, and water resources.   
 
• Climate change is expected to 
exacerbate resource scarcities. 
 
• Asia, Africa, and Latin America will 
account for virtually all the 
population growth over the next 20 
years and states with significant 
youth-bulges, such as Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen, will 
remain ripe for continued instability 
unless employment conditions in 
those states change dramatically. 
 
• Terrorism will likely continue, but its 
appeal could lessen if economic 
growth continues in the Middle East 
and youth unemployment is reduced.  
For those terrorists that remain 
active, the diffusion of technologies 
puts increasingly dangerous 
capabilities within reach. 
 
• Rapid changes in the Middle East, 
including nuclear proliferation and 
the spread of lethal capabilities, 
increase the potential for conflict.   
 
While the Global Trends report 
identifies these trends as relative 
certainties about the future, it also notes 
a number of key uncertainties that make 
it difficult to provide a single 
characterization of the future security 
environment.  The report concludes that 
a “rapidly changing international order 
at a time of growing geopolitical 
challenges increases the likelihood of 
discontinuities, shocks and surprises.  
No single outcome seems preordained.”   
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Two Critical Uncertainties about the 
Future   
Among the many uncertainties about the 
future, there are at least two that are 
critical to the character of the future 
global geopolitical environment about 
which we can now only speculate but 
which nonetheless will have a significant 
impact in the determination of the 
security challenges the United States 
will face in the future:  
 
• The future capacities of key states in 
international system, in terms of 
governance, political influence, 
wealth, and relative military power. 
 
• The future character of the 
international system and the 
relationships between major powers.   
 
The first uncertainty deals with the role 
of the nation-states in the future 
international system.  Specifically, will 
the leading nation-states have the 
capacity to manage the number of 
transnational challenges that are likely to 
emerge in the future or will a prolonged 
global economic downturn and an 
increasingly decentralized world erode 
their ability to cope with these 
challenges?  The second uncertainty 
questions the nature of the future 
international system itself.  Will, for 
example, the multiplicity of important 
actors add strength to the international 
system or will it fragment it, fostering 
competition and incapacitating 
international cooperation on key security 
challenges?   
 
These two uncertainties, depicted 
graphically on perpendicular axes, 
suggest a framework for conceptualizing 
alternative future security environments 
in 2025 and implications for US security 
interests (see figure on following page).  
In the upper right quadrant of our matrix, 
the Concert of Powers scenario 
postulates a multipolar security 
environment where the leading states 
cooperatively tackle transnational 
security challenges.  In the lower left 
quadrant, the Fragmented International 
System scenario describes an 
environment in which the diversity of 
key global actors leads to a disjointed, 
ineffectual approach to managing 
security challenges such as nuclear 
proliferation.   
 
In the lower right quadrant, the Rise of 
Non-state Networks describes an 
environment in which decreasing state 
capacity increases the difficulty for 
governments in managing issues such as 
resource scarcities, ethnic tensions, and 
income inequalities prompting nonstate 
networks to fill the vacuum.  Finally, the 
Return of Great Power Confrontation 
scenario postulates an environment in 
which emerging powers assert their 
growing political, economic, and 
military clout in a global competition for 
























• The Concert of Powers scenario describes a future where the growing number of powerful 
states strengthens the international community’s ability to deal with future security 
challenges, creating opportunities for the United States and its allies to forge new multilateral 
security partnerships. 
  
• The Fragmented International System scenario postulates a security environment in which 
the diffusion of global power makes it more difficult for the international community to 
achieve consensus on managing global security challenges such as nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism, and energy security.   
 
• The Rise of Non-state Networks scenario envisions a future in which the dispersion of power 
and authority away from nation-states gives rise to a myriad of security challenges involving 
sub-national and transnational entities.  
 
• In the Return of Great Power Confrontations scenario, the future security environment is 
defined by increasing competition between rising and status quo global powers for resources, 
markets, and influence.  
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Alternative Scenarios for the 
Future Security Environment  
 
The following scenarios describe 
alternative security narratives for world 
of 2025 depending upon which 
combination of trends identified in the 
Global Trends 2025 report come to 
dominate in the future international 
environment.  For each scenario the 
factors that would drive international 
developments towards that scenario are 
identified and the security challenges 
resulting from the scenario are 
discussed.   
 
• The following four scenarios are 
intended to illustrate—not to 
predict—how a range of security 
challenges might materialize in the 
future depending upon the interplay 
of emerging global trends.2 
 
Multilateral Security …  
In the Concert of Powers scenario, 
emerging and developed powers worked 
cooperatively in managing a variety of 
transnational security challenges.  This 
scenario postulates that the growing 
number of powerful states strengthens 
the international community’s ability to 
deal multilaterally with future security 
challenges.  In this scenario, the United 
States is one of a number important 
                                                
2 Many of the trends identified in Global Trends 
2025 report are present in each scenario but only 
in some scenarios do they result in significant 
security challenges.  Future demographic trends, 
indicating aging societies in many developed 
countries and significant youth populations in 
parts of the developing world, for example, are 
assumed in every scenario but are only assessed 
to create significant security challenges in 
scenarios where there are limited government 
capacities to address the societal needs and 
security issues resulting from these demographic 
changes.  
powers but its leadership remains critical 
in forging new multilateral security 
partnerships to tackle a variety of 
transnational security issues.  Such 
partnerships would likely not be formal 
strategic alliances but rather coalitions of 
key state powers agreeing to work 
cooperatively to address particular 
security issues such as peacekeeping, 
maritime security, and 
counterproliferation.  
 
• Current and recent examples of 
multilateral approaches to security 
challenges such as the Six-Party 
Talks, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, and the anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden 
become the models upon which 
future multinational security efforts 
are based in this scenario.   
 
Driving Trends.  The emergence of a 
multipolar world in which multilateral 
security cooperation becomes the norm 
would likely be preceded by the 
developments in the international system 
intended to successfully accommodate 
the strategic interests of rising global 
powers.  Multilateral institutions, such as 
the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund, in this scenario would 
adapt their structure and performance to 
accommodate the interests of emerging 
powers and the increasingly multipolar 
geopolitical environment.  Rising global 
powers, such as China, in turn would 
view their future economic well-being as 
tied to geopolitical stability incentivizing 
them to work cooperatively with the 
international community in addressing 
security challenges that could impact 
global economic growth.   
 
• This scenario assumes that potential 
sources of significant state 
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competition such as competition over 
access to energy resources are 
mitigated.  In this scenario, 
competition for energy resources 
ease as a result of new energy-
producing technologies, lower 
energy demand as a result of 
increased efficiencies, and the 
exploitation of newly discovered oil 
and gas fields that counterbalances 
the rising energy needs of rising 
powers such as China and India.   
 
• This scenario also postulates 
continued stability in key energy-
producing states, especially those in 
the Middle East.  A stable Middle 
East emerges in this scenario as a 
result of improving security 
conditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan; reduced levels of terrorism; 
international cooperation on 
containing nuclear weapons 
proliferation; and new educational, 
financial, and social policies that 
encourage higher levels of economic 
growth and employment in the 
region. 
 
• In this scenario Iran is dissuaded 
from pursuing destabilizing nuclear 
weapon capabilities by a 
combination of international 
diplomatic initiatives, technological 
impediments, an improved security 
environment, and the desire by 
Tehran to avoid political isolation 
and seek greater integration into the 
global economy.   
 
Key Security Issues.  US security 
challenges in this scenario are mainly 
defined by operations other than war 
and by the issues associated with 
changing foreign perceptions of the 
US role as a global security provider.  
The security environment of 2025 that 
emerges in this scenario is the most 
benign of the four presented in this paper 
in terms of direct threats to US and allied 
interests.  The accommodation of 
emerging powers into existing 
multilateral institutions and the 
incentives created for preserving global 
economic growth suggests the likelihood 
of significant interstate conflicts would 
remain low in this environment.  In 
addition, although terrorism would not 
completely disappear in this scenario, 
the threat it poses would be significantly 
diminished as a result of improved 
multilateral cooperation on counter-
terrorism activities and increased 
stability in the Middle East.  The 
growing divergence between rich and 
poor in this scenario does, however, 
create additional burdens for 
governments that could lead to societal 
disruptions and conflict if not managed 
effectively.  
 
• Global security challenges such as 
proliferation, terrorism, and energy 
security unite rather than divide the 
great powers in this scenario.   
 
• The primary requirement for 
employing US and allied military 
forces in this security environment 
would be in operations other than 
war, frequently as part of a 
multinational coalition.  
 
• This security environment would 
emphasize US and allied military 
capabilities for conducting 
humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations, non-
combatant evacuations, maritime 
security missions, counter-drug and 
counter-proliferation operations, and 
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security assistance, including 
training, to friendly foreign military 
forces.   
 
While traditional threats to US interests 
decrease in this scenario, the changes to 
the future geopolitical landscape that are 
postulated could have a profound impact 
on how the world perceives the future 
role of the US military and US security 
commitments.  As the international 
system adapts to accommodate rising 
powers there would likely be 
accompanying expectations by those 
powers for a greater role in addressing 
security interests within their own 
perceived spheres of influence.   
 
Or Competing Spheres of Influence?   
The Fragmented International System 
scenario postulates a security 
environment in which the diffusion of 
global power increases the difficulty for 
the international community in achieving 
consensus on how to manage global 
security challenges such as proliferation, 
terrorism, and energy security.  In 
addition, varied interests among the 
principal actors in a multipolar world 
increase competition and tensions as 
states seek to strengthen their own 
spheres of influence.  These dynamics 
result in a breakdown of the global order 
into regional and other blocs ushering in 
an era of slower economic growth and 
globalization and ineffectiveness in 
dealing with transnational security 
challenges.    
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario assumes 
that lagging economic growth and 
burden fatigue reduce the West’s 
capacity to manage wide-ranging global 
challenges while the quest for greater 
inclusiveness in existing international 
organizations increases the difficulty of 
achieving consensus on key security 
issues.  In this future, a prolonged global 
economic downturn leads to a loss of 
confidence in Western institutions 
resulting in rising powers exhibiting a 
higher degree of freedom in customizing 
their own policies.  This trend is 
reinforced by the inability of multilateral 
institutions to adapt sufficiently to 
accommodate the interests of emerging 
powers.  
 
• In this scenario, multinational 
forums, such as the G-20 process, 
unravel as their members become 
unwilling to make compromises that 
would allow consensus, resulting in a 
set back for multilateralism.   
 
• The challenges of aging societies in 
Western Europe and Japan drive 
budget allocations in those states in 
this scenario towards social and 
welfare programs and away from 
spending on defense and military 
operations, further eroding the 
West’s capacity to manage 
transnational security issues.   
 
• NATO faces increased challenges to 
its ability to mount sustained future 
security operations in this scenario 
resulting from financial and material 
burdens created by its long-term 
military commitment to Afghanistan 
and the demographic challenges and 
slow economic growth confronting 
many of its member countries.   
 
Competing security interests and lack of 
consensus on managing transnational 
security issues by the major state powers 
creates the conditions for further 
proliferation of nuclear and advanced 
conventional weapons capabilities in this 
scenario.  In addition, the challenges of 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 144
8 
 
acquiring and maintaining modern 
conventional military capabilities in an 
era of limited economic resources causes 
some states to place increasing emphasis 
on nuclear weapons for deterring and 
responding to large-scale conventional 
military attacks.  
  
Key Security Issues.  Nuclear 
proliferation, shifting power dynamics, 
and potential for conflict in the Greater 
Middle East dominate US security 
interests in this scenario.  A breakdown 
of the international cooperation on 
proliferation that leads to a more 
proliferated world will likely have the 
greatest impact in the Middle East where 
Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon 
capability and the shift in the balance of 
power in the region raise the potential 
for conflict and further proliferation.  Of 
significant concern is that an Iranian 
nuclear weapon, or the perception by 
other countries that Iran has acquired a 
nuclear weapon capability, will 
embolden Iran and prompt a regional 
arms race or other military responses 
that destabilizes the region.   
 
Growing Irregular Warfare 
Challenges …   
The Rise of Non-state Networks 
scenario envisions a future security 
environment in which the dispersion of 
power and authority away from nation-
states gives rise to a myriad of security 
challenges involving sub-national and 
transnational entities.  The problem of 
coping with these “global troubles” 
including the spread of violent 
extremism, transnational terrorism and 
crime, food and water scarcities, failing 
states, and intrastate conflicts drives the 
future security agenda.   
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario 
postulates a prolonged global economic 
downturn and an increasingly 
decentralized world leading to the 
dispersion of power and authority away 
from nation-states and fostering the 
growth of sub-national and transnational 
entities.  While states generally seek to 
cooperate on security issues in this 
future they often lack the capacity alone 
to resolve persistent problems such as 
food and water scarcities, ethnic 
rivalries, poverty, and environmental 
degradation.  
 
• The United States continues to be 
called upon to be the primary 
provider of economic and security 
assistance to weakened governments 
in this environment because it is 
unclear if developing powers, such 
as China and India, are willing or 
able to take on this responsibility.   
 
Demographic trends indicate that 
significant portions of the populations in 
parts of Africa, the Middle East, and 
South and Southeast Asia will be less 
than 30 years old in 2025.3  These 
“youth bulges” combined with high 
unemployment, resource scarcities, and 
disruptive political successions increases 
the prospect for instability in this 
scenario.  The West Bank/Gaza, Iraq, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan will especially have large youth 
populations that in this scenario, where 
there is broad unemployment and 
insufficient government capacities, 
become ripe for fostering volatility and 
violence.  Nigeria, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Ethiopia also experience 
rapid youth population growth and 
continuing civil conflict in this future.   
                                                
3 Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World; 
National Intelligence Council, November 2008. 




• A failure to achieve a two-state 
solution in this scenario places 
increasing domestic pressures on 
Israel as it tries to manage the 
security situation in the West Bank 
and Gaza where the combined 
population will grow to nearly six 
million, mostly youthful, people by 
2025.  In addition, Israeli Arabs, 
currently about a fifth of the 
population, will comprise nearly a 
quarter of Israel’s population by 
2025.4  
 
In this scenario, significant migration 
from rural to urban areas and from 
poorer to richer countries occurs and is 
fueled by a widening gap in economic 
and physical security in adjacent areas.  
By 2025, over half the world’s 
population lives in urban areas and 
another eight mega cities are created, 
most in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Muslims from Africa and the Middle 
East continue to migrate to Europe 
shifting the ethnic composition in many 
areas particularly around cities.  The 
lack of economic opportunities and 
difficulties in assimilating these 
immigrant communities in this future 
lead to increased tensions and episodes 
of violence reminiscent of the 2005 Paris 
suburban riots.  
 
• Migration and forced displacement 
are further prompted by significant 
climatic events, environmental 
degradation, and food and water 
scarcities as a result of changing 
climate conditions.   
 
The lack of capacity of many 
governments to manage sufficiently the 
                                                
4 Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World; 
National Intelligence Council, November 2008. 
challenges in this scenario prompts the 
emergence of non-state networks to fill 
the vacuum.  Increasing 
interconnectedness, as a result of 
advancing communication and 
information technologies, enables 
individuals to coalesce around common 
causes across national boundaries.  In 
some situations these new networks act 
as forces for good by pressuring 
governments through non-violent means 
to address injustice, poverty, the impact 
of climate change and other social 
issues.  Other groups, however, use 
networks and global communications to 
proliferate radical ideologies, manipulate 
public opinion, recruit and train fighters 
for their cause, coordinate terrorist 
attacks, and organize criminal activities.   
 
• Turmoil and societal disruptions 
generated by resource scarcities, 
poor governance, ethnic and 
religious rivalries, and forced 
displacements of populations create 
conditions conducive to the spread of 
civil unrest, radicalism, terrorism, 
and insurgencies. 
 
• Diasporas, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), ethnic 
groups, religious organizations, and 
other non-state actors acquire 
significant power in this scenario and 
establish formal and informal 
relationships with states.  
 
• Transnational criminal networks 
grow in this scenario and expand 
their traditional involvement in 
narcotics trafficking to include 
managing global resources such as 
energy, minerals, and other strategic 
markets.    
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• Piracy continues to flourish along 
key maritime traffic routes adjacent 
to land areas lacking sufficient 
government and law enforcement 
capabilities such as in the Gulf of 
Aden.   
 
Key Security Issues:  The challenges 
posed by violent extremism, 
transnational terrorism and criminal 
networks, intrastate conflict, 
stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, failing states, and irregular 
forms of warfare dominate the US 
security agenda in this future.  This 
scenario suggests that many of the future 
security problems will emanate from 
parts of Africa, the Middle East, and 
South and Southeast Asia, and Central 
and South America and spread to other 
parts of the world via transnational 
networks.  The persistence and wide-
ranging character of these problems, 
however, threatens to create operational 
overload of military forces, especially 
US and allied ground forces that might 
be frequently called upon to respond to 
these security challenges, and 
engagement fatigue among the public of 
countries providing these forces.   
 
• This security environment 
emphasizes US and allied 
capabilities for conducting 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 
special operations, stability and 
reconstruction operations, urban 
conflict, critical infrastructure 
protection, and homeland security.   
 
Or High End Asymmetric Threats?   
In the Return of Great Power 
Confrontations scenario the future 
security environment is defined by 
increasing competition between rising 
and status quo global powers for 
resources, markets, and influence.  In 
some cases these competitions lead to 
interstate confrontations.  Although total 
war involving massed force-on-force 
military clashes among the great powers 
is still unlikely, conflicts involving 
limited military objectives and warfare 
through non-military means, such as 
information, economic and resource 
warfare, become more prevalent in this 
environment.   
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario 
postulates that future global economic 
growth leads to an unprecedented 
transfer of wealth and economic power 
roughly from West to East.  Existing 
international institutions, however, can 
not adapt successfully to the changing 
geopolitical landscape, leading to some 
countries to want to challenge the 
Western-led global order.   
 
• Emerging powers in this scenario 
increasingly lack confidence in 
global institutions such as the United 
Nations to resolve emerging security 
challenges and to protect their 
interests.  
 
• Lagging Western growth prompts 
protectionist measures against faster-
growing emerging powers leading to 
resentment and competition in the 
international system.   
 
Rising energy demands of growing 
populations and economies bring into 
question in this scenario the availability, 
reliability, and affordability of energy 
supplies.  Energy producers that scaled 
back investments in energy 
infrastructures during earlier economic 
downturns can no longer keep pace with 
rising demands as the global economy 
recovers.  Perceptions of energy scarcity 
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drive states to take actions to assure their 
future access to energy supplies.   
 
• Nationalist sentiments rise as states 
perceive themselves to be in an 
intense competition for influence, 
markets, and resources in this zero-
sum world. 
 
• New strategic relationships develop 
between energy deficient and energy 
rich states including increasing 
codependency of Russia and Europe 
over energy, Chinese efforts to 
strengthen political and security ties 
to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states, and growing Indian influence 
and involvement in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. 
 
• Middle East states, looking to 
diversify their security relationships 
and reduce their reliance on the 
United States, seek to increase their 
political and economic ties with 
Europe, China, Russia, and India 
leading to a strategic competition 
among several powers for influence 
and access to energy resources in the 
region. 
 
• China increases its political and 
security relations in this scenario 
with countries in the littoral areas 
adjacent to its key energy sea lines of 
communications, such as Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, to obtain 
their support for future Chinese 
naval operations in these areas. 
 
• Balance of power dynamics emerge 
in this future that resembles a 21st 
century replay of the years before 
1914 with major powers developing 
networks of friendly states through 
security arrangements, arms 
transfers, and economic relationships 
to secure their interests and constrain 
the actions of potential rivals.   
 
Evolving competitions for energy 
security are increasingly supported by 
military capabilities raising the potential 
for heightened tensions and even 
conflict.  In this scenario, for example, 
the leading powers use the benefits of 
their growing economies to engage in 
naval and military buildups and 
modernization efforts to protect critical 
economic assets and to secure access to 
energy resources prompting increased 
tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing.  
These buildups raise concerns about the 
future of maritime security in a zone 
extending from the Persian Gulf to East 
and Southeast Asia.   
 
• A naval arms race in Asia occurs in 
this scenario in response to China’s 
development of naval power 
projection, including the 
development of aircraft carriers and 
“anti-access” capabilities such as 
attack submarines and antiship 
ballistic missiles that become widely 
viewed as efforts by Beijing to 
extend its political influence in the 
region and to deter attempts to cut 
off China’s sea-borne energy 
supplies by threatening mutual 
disruption of sea trade as a 
consequence.  
 
• Different interpretations of maritime 
sovereignty and permissible activity 
by foreign vessels in Exclusive 
Economic Zones lead to future 
incidents at sea such as the March 
2009 incident between Chinese 
vessels and the USNS Impeccable in 
the South China Sea. 
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• The Indian Ocean by 2025 becomes 
a common operating area for 
nuclear-armed submarines from 
several countries including India, 
China, and Pakistan that have only 
limited experience in conducting 
such patrols, increasing the risk of 
accidents or unintended incidents 
between and among naval powers in 
the region. 
 
• Mutual suspicions regarding the 
intentions behind naval build-ups by 
potential regional rivals and the 
establishment of maritime security 
alliances that exclude key players 
undermine efforts to achieve broad 
international cooperation on 
maritime security in this scenario.  
 
Key Security Issues.  The primary US 
security challenges in this scenario 
stem from foreign competition for 
strategic resources, markets and 
influence; military buildups and 
disputed assertions of sovereignty, and 
threats to access to the “global 
commons.”  Energy security is 
increasingly militarized in this scenario, 
and growing “resource nationalism” 
heightens interstate tensions and raises 
the potential for conflict over disputed 
energy resources.  To the extent that 
traditional security issues remain 
unresolved in this future, they now 
assume new political-security 
dimensions in the context of growing 
resource and military competitions 
among the major powers.   
 
Perceptions of energy scarcity might 
drive countries to take action to assure 
their future access to energy supplies. In 
the worst case, this could lead to 
interstate conflicts if government leaders 
deem assured access to energy resources 
to be essential to maintaining domestic 
stability and the survival of their regime.  
However, even actions short of war will 
have important geopolitical implications 
as states undertake strategies such as 
developing new alliances and building 
up naval capabilities to hedge against the 
possibility that existing energy supplies 
will not meet rising demands.  
 
• Advances in exploration and drilling 
technologies might create new 
opportunities to find and exploit 
previously unexplored ultra-deep oil 
fields.  Such fields, however, may be 
located in areas of contested 
ownership, such as Asia or the 
Arctic, creating the potential for 
conflict.   
 
• In May 2009, the Kremlin published 
a document regarding the national 
security of the Russian Federation 
until 2020.  It noted that the attention 
of international policy over the long 
term would be focused on sources of 
energy reserves and listed the Middle 
East, the shelf of the Barents Sea, 
other areas in the Arctic, the Caspian 
basin, and Central Asia as among 
those sources.  The document further 
stated that in the face of the 
competition for resources, the use of 
military force could not be 
excluded.5   
 
                                                
5 Strategy of National Security of the Russia 
Federation until 2020, http://www.scrf.gov.ru  
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